



Gender and the legal academy in the UK: a product of proxies 
and hiring and promotion practices
Duff, L. and Webley, L.
 
This is a pre-publication version of a book chapter to be published in: Auchmuty, R.S. 
(ed.) Gender and Careers in the Legal Academy, UK, Hart Publishing.
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the 
research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain 
with the authors and/or copyright owners.
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely 
distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: ((http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/).
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail repository@westminster.ac.uk
Gender and the legal academy in the 
UK: a product of proxies and hiring 
and promotion practices
Liz Duff and Lisa Webley*
Abstract
In this chapter we examine the differential numbers of men and women in each of the seniority 
levels of the legal academy with reference to qualitative studies on gender and the legal 
academy in the literature, and our initial analysis of the UK Higher Education Statistical 
Agency’s systematically collected data derived from all higher education institutions in the 
United Kingdom. We then apply the human resource management research literature to these 
data to seek to understand how decision-making in the academy may explain ongoing 
inequalities. Our research suggests that the continued disparity in male-female promotion 
trajectories is, at least in part, a function of the way in which talent, merit, or excellence is 
understood and operationalised in the academy more widely. We posit that the disparity in the 
numbers of men and women at the higher levels of the legal academy will only be successfully 
countered once we adopt a more sophisticated approach to analysing what makes an excellent 
law teacher/researcher/administrator and then develop and promote people on that basis.
INTRODUCTION
The academy has a long tradition of critical discourse about sex, race and other forms of 
discrimination and how unconscious and not so unconscious biases lead to negative outcomes 
for those who are not within traditional dominant groups in their society. Indeed, the academy 
has been one of the key sites of struggle to uncover discriminatory thinking and to posit new 
ways of being, so as to limit oppressive practices. 
In the UK, University College London allowed women to participate in some evening classes 
from the 1860s and in some mixed classes from the 1872-73 academic year, including some 
law courses; the women’s hall of residence opened in 1882 (UoL Constituent Colleges, 345-59; 
and see Auchmuty, in this book). Meanwhile, women’s colleges had been set up at Cambridge 
in 1869 (Girton and Newnham) and at Oxford in 1879 (Somerville and Lady Margaret Hall), 
with small numbers of women entering law almost from the start (Auchmuty 2008). In 1878 
University College became the first university in England to allow women to take the same 
exams and get degrees on equal terms with men (UoL Constituent Colleges, 345-59), and in 
1888 Eliza Orme was the first woman in England and Laetitia Walkington in Ireland to gain 
law degrees (First 100 Years). Yet although women could study law at university, they could 
not actually become lawyers, as the professional associations excluded them from their own 
qualifying examinations.  Women had been campaigning for admission to the legal profession 
from the 1870s and in 1912 Gwyneth Bebb, effectively a first-class honours law graduate from 
Oxford (which allowed women to take the examinations, but not to get degrees), was chosen as 
a test case to take the Law Society to court for their refusal to admit women (Auchmuty 2011; 
Rackley and Auchmuty 2019).  She lost, but the case won valuable support for the cause, and 
after the first world war it was clear that women had proved themselves capable of succeeding 
in the most demanding university courses and could no longer be denied a public role in law on 
the grounds of lack of intelligence or expertise.   The Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 
19191 paved the way for a whole series of ‘firsts’ for women entering professional, including 
legal, life: it enabled them to become solicitors (Cruickshank, 2019; Cruickshank, 2019b)), 
barristers (Bourne, 2019; Goldthorpe, 2019; Lindsay, 2019;) and magistrates (Logan, 2019;) 
and to sit on juries, and encouraged Oxford to grant degrees to women; Cambridge held out 
until 1949. 
In the academic world, Edith Morley became the first woman appointed as a university 
professor in Britain in 1908 (in English Language), at University College, Reading, now the 
University of Reading (Fort, 2016).  The first woman to teach law was Ivy Williams, who had 
also been the first woman to qualify as a barrister, but forswore legal practice in favour of a 
post as law tutor at Oxford in 1920 (Auchmuty 2008).  Frances Moran was appointed professor 
of law at Trinity College, Dublin (Ireland), in 1925 (Hutchinson 2019), but the numbers of 
women teaching in university law schools could be counted on the fingers of one hand until 
well after the second world war, and the first woman law professor in the UK, Claire Palley, 
was not appointed until 1970, at Queen’s University, Belfast (Cownie 2015; Cownie, 2019; and 
see Cownie, in this book). 
This very clear male dominance at the higher reaches of the legal academy persists, in marked 
contrast to the outcomes that would have been anticipated had the trickle-up theory of equality 
lived up to its promise. That theory is founded on the principle that once sufficient numbers of 
women had attended university and earned the qualifications deemed necessary to enter 
professional life, women would advance at proportionately the same rate as men and be 
proportionately dispersed at all levels of professional life. By implication, trickle-up theory 
does not concede any inequality of opportunity once formal barriers to career development are 
removed, it does not recognise informal structural or cultural barriers. Instead, one would have 
to infer that women are responsible for their lack of progression in the legal academy given any 
disproportionate outcomes. 
The theory has been largely debunked by academics (Sommerlad 1994 at p. 34; McGlynn 2003 
at p. 139; Malleson 2003, pp. 175-190) and in legal professional circles, at least in those 
sections of the profession that are concerned about diversity, equality and inclusion. Instead, an 
economic rationalist model is advanced that seeks to uncover unconscious biases or informal 
structural and cultural barriers within the workplace so as to unlock the economic potential of 
female talent with the aim of improving firms’ profitability (Sommerlad 1998).  Workplace 
1
 Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919, see section 1: “section 1, which stated that:
A person shall not be disqualified by sex or marriage from the exercise of any public function, or from being 
appointed to or holding any civil or judicial office or post, or from entering or assuming or carrying on any civil 
profession or vocation, or for admission to any incorporated society (whether incorporated by Royal Charter or 
otherwise), [and a person shall not be exempted by sex or marriage from the liability to serve as a juror]…” The 
Act removed women’s disqualification from the civil service, the university sector and the courts.  See Takayanagi 
2019)
stratification has subsequently been recognised and viewed through this lens (Ashley and 
Empson 2013) because this business case for equality and diversity is replete with flaws, not 
least it is avowedly neo-liberal rather than emancipatory and places equality as a servant of the 
economy (McGlynn 2000, 2003b; Webley and Duff 2007; Ashley and Empson 2013; Ackroyd 
and Muzio 2007; Sommerlad 2012, 2002, 1994, Wilkins 2004). Evidence of a causal 
relationship between gender (in)equality and profitability is also somewhat scant. The best 
evidence on this appears to be available from the 30% Club, which seeks to ensure that women 
make up at least 30% of board representation (McKinsey and Company 2007), although this 
has been disputed (see Buchanan, 2012).  But business case and talent management research 
has injected some new thinking into the relatively intractable structure versus agency debate as 
regards female attrition from the workplace (e.g. Chullion, Collings and Claigiuri 2010; Howe, 
Davidson and Sloboda 1998 at pp.399-400), as discussed later in the chapter. And that provides 
access to innovative ways of thinking about how decision-making biases may impede women’s 
progress and promotion, even if it does not offer a particularly useful model through which to 
understand why decision-making biases persist.
STUDY AND METHODS
In this chapter we examine the differential numbers of men and women in each of the seniority 
levels of the legal academy with reference to others’ qualitative studies on gender and the legal 
academy and our initial analysis of the UK Higher Education Statistical Agency’s 
systematically collected data (HESA data) derived from all higher education institutions in the 
United Kingdom. We then apply the talent management or human resource management 
research literature to these data to seek to understand how decision-making in the academy 
may explain ongoing inequalities. Our research suggests that the continued disparity in male-
female promotion trajectories is, at least in part, a function of the way in which talent, merit, or 
excellence is understood in the academy. We posit that the disparity in the numbers of men and 
women (and minority groups) at the higher levels of the legal academy will only be 
successfully countered once we adopt a more sophisticated approach to analysing what makes 
an excellent law teacher/researcher/administrator and then develop and promote people on that 
basis. 
In this phase of our study we have not considered the individual agency of academics, having 
not interviewed legal academics about their experience in the workplace or on promotion 
panels, nor considered individual biographies that may explain how particular people have 
navigated their career pathways. We note this omission, although consider that in the light of 
our examination of data derived from the population of 5,335 full-time and part-time legal 
academics2, the influence of individual agency would have a lesser influence on macro level 
outcomes than would informal structural and cultural factors operating within the legal 
academic community. The human resource management literature interrogates notions of 
excellence and approaches to developing excellence and how they can be harnessed to support 
fair recruitment, development and promotion processes in the workplace from a largely 
structural and in some instances cultural perspective. However, we have sought to reduce the 
lack of focus on agency by applying insights from the literature in this respect.
2
 This figure is drawn from the 2014-15 data set and may include some senior technical and administrative staff 
who are considered to be on law school staff in the UK, rather than part of university centrally managed staff 
numbers. 
Our chapter begins with a discussion of the literature on women in the legal academy. It then 
considers the HESA data on this point, before examining what the literature on ‘talent 
management’ may do to assist our ways of thinking about staff development and promotions in 
higher education. It explores how this may affect women, and what could be done to limit 
discriminatory thinking and practices. 
PREVIOUS STUDIES ON WOMEN IN THE LEGAL ACADEMY
This enquiry developed from our research aimed at understanding some of the problems 
women and minorities have encountered in the practising legal profession. Much has been 
written on women lawyers, on inequality of opportunities and the reasons for persistent 
differences in their status and seniority, as references above indicate. Less research has been 
undertaken on gender and the legal academy although notable studies by Collier (2002, 1998), 
Cownie (1998, 2004, 2015), McGlynn (1998, 1999, 2003), Thornton (2013, 2004, 2001, 1998), 
Vaughan (2016) and Wells (2003, 2001), among others, provide insight into how working 
practices and trends in higher education, particularly in the common law English-speaking 
world, have shaped the experience of women law academics and may have led to differential 
promotion opportunities and career trajectories.
McGlynn (1998) provided one of the earliest studies from England and Wales of women not 
only in academia, but also in legal practice, and included information detailing the law courses 
that taught feminist legal studies. McGlynn’s data were collected in 1997 directly from Law 
Schools and, whilst a handful of law schools did not respond, with a 93% response rate the data 
are robust and reliable. This survey found that in 1997 4 per cent of law professors were 
women, when in the university sector as a whole, women represented 9 per cent of all 
professors. McGlynn commented positively that the number of women improved lower down 
the hierarchy where ‘over one third of staff in law schools are women’ (1998, p. 41). The 
implication, at least for some, was that greater numbers of women would become professors 
with the passage of time there would be an inevitable trickle-up effect.
There was nonetheless a formal and substantive equality gap in UK law schools, given that 
there were relatively few women in senior positions (Collier 2002, p. 8). Whilst the obvious 
poor practices associated with recruitment and promotion were acknowledged, Collier’s study 
found that the masculine culture of the law school played a significant role in the lack of 
female advancement, with routine ‘disassociation of women from authority to a persistent 
benchmarking and assessment of women against a normative ‘ideal’ employee’ (2002, p. 9). 
This is something we shall return to in later sections, as assessment against the normative ideal 
is often perceived as good rather than poor practice, and yet is so often a product of 
unconscious biases leading to unequal treatment. Cownie suggested that the majority of legal 
academics appeared to ‘lack awareness’ about gender inequality and ‘that awareness of gender 
issues is not very deeply embedded into the culture of academic law’ (2004, p. 91). In the 
Australian context, Thornton observed that a university senior management heavily dominated 
by men created an environment in which women felt marginalised yet without management 
acknowledgement of this as a problem (2004). Collier concluded that ‘There is no reason to 
believe, in short, that the dominance of men has shifted simply because a new intellectual 
terrain has evolved or because lip service is now paid to gender equity’ (2002, p. 28). Without 
any real appetite to tackle gender inequality, it appeared unlikely that the culture would change.  
Previous studies consequently indicated that promotion within the legal academy rested on a 
favourable assessment against the ideal legal academic, a template drawn up in a masculine 
culture. And that promotion was in part a function of one’s performance being judged highly in 
the context of tasks deemed hierarchically more elite within that culture. Cownie’s (2004) 
respondents identified progression and promotion requiring research, Collier explained ‘...the 
performance and research productivity of all academic staff has become crucial to the status, 
financial health and, perhaps, the very future of the law school itself.’ (2002, p. 15).  
Interestingly Cownie’s informants perceived that being a good academic lawyer involved 
primarily two skills, first, analysis and ‘the need for curiosity’ and, second, communication 
skills (2004, 81), with academics in “old” universities valuing organisational skills and 
persistence (often through a research lens) alongside these as well. Yet when the respondents 
were asked about what qualities were required to become a professor, the majority, across both 
genders and both old and new university sectors, identified significant amounts of research as 
the key. There is also reference to the need for ‘informal contacts’ and the ability to network (at 
p. 87), both of which are more easily achievable when one is part of a dominant group rather 
than a marginalised one. Cownie (2004) found that the respondents in this study identified the 
colleagues who were promoted to chairs as ‘not good citizens’ and considered them ruthless 
and ambitious, stereotypically masculine qualities (2004, p. 88). Thus, some tasks are not only 
valued less, they appeared to be valued not at all and should, where possible, be actively 
avoided if one wants to court promotion.
Since the majority of these studies were undertaken, there have been a number of significant 
changes in the higher education sector in the UK, a sector now perceived and configured to be 
a market. These included: the introduction of student fees, which changed the relationship 
between student and academic; the drive for greater efficiency; and the introduction of new 
public management systems of governance and surveillance that in time gave way to even 
more aggressive neo-liberal oversight, all of which led to the removal of ‘collegiate self 
governance’ and the imposition of ‘top down’ management. Ostensibly these changes appear to 
impact equally on women and men, both experiencing the same demands. Referring to 
academics using Thornton’s term of ‘new knowledge worker’ (2001b), all academics are now 
in competition, whether it is with academics from other law schools or from within one’s own 
school (2004). Competition is powered by prestige and, given that that resides in research 
outputs, grants and awards, the invisible work (pastoral care, good citizenship, mentoring and 
in some instances teaching) gets pushed to the margins when assessments of merit are being 
made. Further, to enhance their career both men and women need to be able to demonstrate 
commitment by working long hours and being available to travel to international research 
conferences. Collier (2002) concluded that there were physical and psychological costs to 
academic life and that these are not gender neutral but gendered. The studies point to a culture 
in which assessments of merit are driven by the value hierarchy placed on different types of 
task, where measures of performativity are firmly entrenched across the higher education sector 
and there is little if any understanding of the gendered nature of the inputs or the outputs of 
these measures.  
In this study, we were interested to see whether there had been an increase in female 
representation within the legal academy, and whether there was anything that we could learn 
from human resource management literature that would assist in improving the approaches to 
promotion set out above. 
DATA ON GENDER AND THE LEGAL ACADEMY IN ENGLAND AND 
WALES
To date the discussion of women in the legal academy has tended to focus on the micro level 
experiences of women and men, their choices and the barriers that they have faced.  Much of 
this research has been biographical, providing detailed data on critical career points and how 
people make decisions to pursue particular opportunities or to challenge or to recover from 
decisions that went against them (see Cownie, 2015 and further Archer, 2003). We have sought 
instead to consider the experience of men and women at a macro level, drawing upon the 
United Kingdom legal academic population data collected by the UK’s Higher Education 
Statistical Agency (HESA). HESA has statutory responsibility for annually collecting 
demographic and other data on all staff and students in the UK higher education sector. The 
annual exercise is mandatory and systematic and provides an aggregated dataset that academics 
and others may pay to access for research purposes, subject to ethical approval.  We requested 
and analysed both the 2014-15 and 2015-16 law data sets and compared this against the 
publicly available all-discipline HESA data over the same period. We have also considered our 
findings in light of the other national study on law academics, by McGlynn, from the late 
1990s, to examine whether differences have emerged over just under 20 years.
The table below sets out the most recent data on legal academics coded as having their main 
discipline as ‘Law’ working as academics in universities in the United Kingdom. We have 
displayed the data by gender and ethnicity (according to the HESA groups). There is some 
overlap between the figures contained in the Heads/Senior Function Leads column and the 
Professors column, as many Heads of Law Faculty/School/Department will also be Professors. 
There are also some challenges in terminology use as the two main university sectors, the pre-
1992 sector (often referred to as old universities) and the post-1992 sector (often referred to as 
new universities) use the lecturer titles differently.3 Both sectors benchmark these roles against 
a national pay scale of Academic 2-4, and so we have used these in the column headings to 
minimise confusion. But that does mean that law lecturers in old universities may sometimes 
fall into the AC2 column and others into the AC3 column.  
It may be helpful to put the law-specific data into some context. Across all disciplines in the 
2015-16 session there were some 201,380 academics and 208,750 non-academic staff in the 
UK.4 Just over 45% of all academics in the UK were women, with relatively more women at 
junior and mid-levels (92.4% women compared with 82.6% men) and relatively fewer in the 
higher levels of the academy (5.2% women are professors compared to 13.8% of men; 2.4% of 
women hold other senior academic posts vs. 3.6% of men).5 The table below sets out the law 
specific data, across the main role descriptors that have been nationally agreed across the 
academy. There are 5,335 law academics in the UK, of which 93% are on the types of contract 
displayed in this table. 
3
 Old universities have senior lecturers and a very wide band of lecturers, new universities have principal lecturers 
equivalent to the old university senior lecturers, and divide the old university lectureship into two: senior lecturer 
and lecturer.  
4
 79% of the academic staff are white, and 84% of the non-academic staff. 69% of academic staff are from the UK 
compared to 89% of the non-academic staff. Women make up 45.4% of the academic staff population and 54.7%. 
5
 HESA Table B Academic Staff (excluding atypical) by source of basic salary, academic employment function, 
salary range, contract level. Terms of employment, mode of employment and sex 2015-16 available at: 
https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/staff/overviews?breakdown%5B%5D=583&year=620&=Apply 
Table 1: Higher Education Statistical Agency Data 2015-6 for Law Academics






















































                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
The percentages displayed in italics are those that indicate the male to female proportions 
within the specified role, the percentages in roman (standard) text indicate the proportions of 
men or women within each of the specified roles, but do not compare the two against each 
other. They provide an indication of the steepness of the pyramid, for example only 2.7% of all 
law academics within the table are Heads of Law Schools, while 14.7% are professors.
There are additional groups (some managerial contracts n19 and some hybrid administrative 
roles n34) that are not included here, nor are research and teachings assistants who are not on 
full academic contracts (n412).  This accounts for the disparity in figures at various points of 
our analysis. 
The table shows that there are marginally more women than men in the discipline of law 
(51%), which is perhaps unsurprising given that the UK law graduate population is also tipped 
in favour of women (c. 64% of law graduates are female).6 But even given the similar number 
of men and women in the legal academy, the senior ranks are dominated by men (62% of all 
law school heads, 69% of all professors). The legal academy follows a similar pattern to the 
wider academic population, in that men are concentrated in greater numbers at the senior levels 
and women at the mid and more junior ones.  Given that women are noted to undertake more 
teaching and more pastoral support, the invisible roles, and that research is valorised above all, 
this is perhaps to be expected. Women are slightly more likely to hold a management role 
(head of school) than to hold a research leadership role (professorship), and as discussed below 
this may be associated with promotion for teaching and academic citizenship rather than the 
more prestigious promotion route via research excellence. 
On analysis of their distribution by contract type (teaching only, teaching and research and 
research only) too, we note that women make up 55% of those on teaching-only contracts (n 
937 of N 1690) and 69% of research-only contracts (n 179 of N 258) although we also note that 
the research-only contracts tend to be temporary rather than permanent contracts. Teaching and 
research contracts are relatively evenly split between women and men (48:52). Men and 
women have relatively similar patterns of full-time and part-time work although women are 
6
 For a detailed breakdown of the graduating cohort and subsequent entry and progression in the legal profession 
see Webley, 2018.
more likely to be part-time than are men: 60% of women being in full-time employment 
compared with 69% of men. Claims that women are not being promoted due to part-time 
working practices are unlikely to be substantiated on this reading of the data. Academic 
institutions have a much better record of permitting flexible working and part-time working 
than does the practising legal profession; it may be that part-time working leads to a longer 
promotion track than for full-time academics, as has been noted in private practice, but that is 
not likely to account for the difference in promotion, given that the data have not been 
displayed by age or experience.
Female representation within law schools has been strong for many decades and as such 
women should be at least equal in number to men at all levels of promotion unless one were to 
conclude that men were naturally more talented than women or that other factors beyond merit 
are implicated in promotion decisions. When we compare the current data with McGlynn’s 
data from 1997 we note that the proportion of female professors has increased significantly 
(14% women in 1997; 31% in 2015-16) and the proportion of women at AC4 level including 
Reader and Principal Lecturer has increased from 40% to 48%. We would suggest, however, 
that in the context of the AC4 classification, that is likely to be due to an increase in the 
number of teaching- and student-focused Principal Lecturer roles rather than because more 
women have been promoted to Reader on the basis of research.  We do not, however, have any 
data to test this hypothesis. And further, promotion on grounds of teaching excellence may be 
more apparent within ‘new universities’ that are more teaching-focused than in ‘old 
universities’ that are more research-focused and the data do not allow us to differentiate 
between these two sectors. In short, the masculine culture that the legal education studies 
revealed above, may have weakened, but there appear to be ongoing inequalities within 
pathways to promotion and/or promotion processes that have differential impacts on men and 
women. In the next section we consider whether the literature on human resource management 
provides access to new ways of measuring merit such that the normative ideal employee is not 
a masculine embodiment. 
IDENTIFYING AND MANAGING EXCELLENCE
A rich research literature has developed within the discipline of human resource management 
and informed by the psychology of decision-making, which provides a useful foundation for 
understanding how excellent potential and excellent performance may be identified, measured 
and developed, but equally how all too often it is misread and wrongly valorised. Most 
institutions would argue that they seek to attract the best people, but the literature suggests that 
they have a relatively poor understanding of what excellence means in terms of the skills, 
attributes and qualities needed across their various strands of activity (Collings and Mellahi 
2009 at p. 313). Further, the way in which notions of talent or excellence are conceptualised 
also play an important role in the way in which candidates are selected, developed and 
promoted.  For example, Tansley’s commentary on Gagne’s work suggests that talent, or 
excellence, is often viewed in binary terms. In a western world view it is all too often 
considered to be the product of a gift or natural aptitude that one has from a very young age 
(Tansley 2001 at pp. 267-268). This is in stark contrast to Eastern notions of excellence, which 
are considered to be a function of a high degree of practice and striving, linked to character 
rather than a gift (Tansley 2001 at p. 267; Gagné 2001; Ashton and Morton 2005 at p. 30; 
Heller, Mönks, Sternberg, and Subotnik 2001 at p. 67). Both conceptions have their limitations, 
and of course they are presented in an essentialist and simplified format here, but the Western 
conception is more likely to lead to individuals being misidentified as talented or not talented 
on the basis of proxies for excellence (early awards for academic or sporting prowess at a 
young age, school grades in unrelated disciplines and which may in reality be more a product 
of social background and school attended rather than ability and yet are often perceived to be 
the product of innate ability) (Webley and Duff 2017).  These proxies for excellence are more 
likely to privilege socially dominant groups and disadvantage others (Webley et al. 2016).  
Consequently, our attempts to measure people against criteria for excellence in an effort to 
reach merit-based results can in fact have the effect of embedding inequality rather than 
reducing it, unless we treat our use of proxies with a degree of scepticism. 
Universities with their public-sector heritage are more likely than private sector employers in 
the UK to have detailed job descriptions and person specifications, as well as published 
promotion processes with promotion criteria, against which to recruit and promote. There is a 
nationally agreed set of role profiles at each of the Ac2-4 levels of seniority in higher education 
institutions and also a national pay spine benchmarked against these. Universities also have a 
relatively stable set of proxies that are deemed to be markers of excellence with reference to 
national metrics such as the Research Excellence Framework (REF)7, the Teaching Excellence 
Framework (TEF)8 and the proposed Knowledge Exchange Framework (KEF). The challenge 
in the context of the practising profession is to draw up nuanced definitions of excellence so as 
to be able to develop and evaluate how workplace structures and cultures may be supporting or 
impeding excellence among their staff (Tansley at 266). In contrast, in the academy the proxies 
include detailed breakdowns of qualifications by level, awards associated with academic or 
publication excellence, research grant income (with a hierarchy of prestige for funders, as well 
as the amount awarded), and esteem factors (such as visiting positions), teaching experience 
(less clearly defined), whether one has run or convened a course/module (again, less clearly 
defined), management experience (also defined in somewhat vague terms). The proxies are 
precise in the context of research but somewhat less well articulated in respect of teaching, 
which may be linked to the established nature of the REF exercise and the relatively recent 
introduction of the TEF. It may also, perhaps, be that markers of excellence have coalesced 
around the high-status work (research) and the low status work (teaching and university 
administration) has been added as something of an afterthought. Although university rhetoric is 
now that teaching and research are of equal merit and that promotion on those bases are 
identical in stature, this is not borne out by the findings of the qualitative studies above. The 
old hierarchies still persist across all disciplines and HR practices are centrally managed 
through university policies that apply to all disciplines   
In university law schools the challenge may be more to find a means to integrate approaches to 
developing staff while also holding on to excellence in teaching and research that may not be 
7
 This is a national assessment conducted at discipline level (in this case law) to assess the quality of the 
publications, research impact and research environment at an individual law school level.  Law school research 
quality may then be benchmarked and compared.  This REF exercise takes place every 6-8 years, the last one was 
published in 2014 and the next will be 2021.
8
 This is an assessment of the teaching quality in universities with reference to a range of metrics including the 
national student survey of student satisfaction with their university experiences.  Universities in the TEF pilot 
have been given one of three teaching award levels: gold, silver or bronze.  The TEF pilot has now developed 
from institution level to discipline level assessment and Law (along with Management) is included within the pilot 
disciplines.  
captured by the metrics of REF, TEF, the National Student Survey (NSS)9, and DLHE and its 
successor. And further, to be able to promote academic service both in the academic 
community (research and teaching mentoring, peer reviewing of research publications and of 
research grants) and the wider civic community too (in the local community through, for 
example, public legal education or lending academic expertise to local projects). Law 
academics are prey to the same unconscious biases as are others, including confirmation bias 
by which our brains are primed to find evidence to confirm what we believe to be true and to 
gloss over evidence that is contrary to our view. Unconscious bias is associated with a way of 
thinking that has been termed system one thinking (Kahnemann, 2011), which makes heavy 
use of heuristics or proxies designed so as to facilitate rapid decision-making in uncertain 
contexts. The resulting decisions are not necessarily nuanced or based on solid evidence, but 
they lead to certainty and action. That is useful in situations where quick thinking is of the 
essence and where a pause to reflect may lead to negative consequences (think of situations 
where a person could be in personal danger unless they decide on a swift course of action).  
But system one thinking is less useful in complex situations that require data to be weighed. 
System one decision-making draws upon past precedent and so is inherently conservative and 
derivative. If used for hiring and promotion decisions it is likely to lead to homogenous 
workforces drawn from dominant groups. Yet it masquerades as objective as it draws on 
apparently objextive standards (even if these are, really, blunt proxies). This makes it facially 
appealing. In a law school context, publication prizes and high-status research grants are often 
taken as markers of academic excellence, although consideration of how access to a high-
profile mentor may have assisted a candidate to achieve these awards, or how a period of 
research leave or a lighter administrative load may have contributed to them is often not part of 
the assessment process. And teaching prizes and excellent student feedback may count for 
significantly less.
If we are to challenge inbuilt inequalities the literature suggests that we need to establish 
system two thinking within out law schools. System two decision-making requires the 
weighing of a range of data to give rise to a decision, with reflection on how that data is only 
an indirect measure of excellence and one that hides the social and cultural capital of 
candidates being considered for the role. It looks at each situation on its merits and is thus both 
more innovative and more likely to give rise to concerns of risk. It also “feels” more subjective 
given the weighing of different proxies against each other, and the ensuing debate that follows. 
It may lead outsiders to question the outcomes that flow from it, as they are not necessarily 
privy to all the data that was considered and may not be able to “see” how the decision was 
reached.  It would require us to consider how some colleagues benefit from lighter teaching 
and administrative loads, and thus have more time to be successful at research; and to note that 
research grant success tends to breed further success, and that initial success can be about who 
you are working with rather than how strong you are as a sole researcher. It would also 
necessitate a more nuanced appreciation of the interplay between different facets of academic 
life, and how these may contribute to the good of the law school in ways that do not always 
appear as obvious as those that provide individual glory. In short, it is time-consuming, more 
challenging and requires a degree of honesty about the ways in which some roles and 
responsibilities are deemed more worthy than others, and the benefits that some colleagues get 
9 This is a national survey of all students in their final undergraduate year, which seeks their views on their 
satisfaction with their teaching, assessment, course of study, university facilities etc, details of which are 
published nationally.
at the expense of others, given that some people (usually women) are assigned academic 
citizenship roles that allow others (often men) to follow more glamorous pathways.
CONCLUSIONS
Senior academic appointments have tended to be grounded in the Western tradition with a 
focus on the search for apparently innately talented individuals who have had a smooth and 
swift trajectory through the career ranks from evidence of undergraduate excellence and 
beyond, with a wealth of individual publications, research grants, and research related esteem 
factors. Substantial attention has been placed on attracting, hiring and retaining this group of 
academics, less to developing and nurturing more junior colleagues unless they too have early 
signs of these markers of excellence (for details of good practice see Fried-Fiori, Manch and 
Paldziewicz in Mottershead 2003).  Colleagues have often historically been expected to self-
manage their careers, and junior colleagues to seek out sponsors or mentors who may provide 
them with research opportunities, rather than teaching opportunities, in which they may shine 
(see Collings and Mellahi). Were we to consider talent to be a product of years of striving and 
environment, we may be more inclined to focus on ensuring that the conditions within our law 
schools were optimal for excellence to flourish and to be developed. We may also be less 
concerned with seeking out exceptional people, but rather those people with a desire to strive to 
develop themselves and others. And in doing this, markers of cultural and social capital may 
have less influence, diminishing the privilege that comes with membership of a dominant 
group. It would also send a powerful message to our students, that hard work rather than 
privilege is likely to be the means by which one succeeds.
But how to achieve this?  The literature on the psychology of decision-making suggests that we 
are only likely to challenge our unconscious biases (if that is what they are) by slowing down 
our decision-making processes, by building in deliberative, reflective decision-making.  To do 
this we would need to recognise that the measures of excellence are “proxies” that we fall back 
on when we struggle to be able to find ways of measuring excellence in direct terms. And we 
would treat them as indirect rather than direct measures of excellence which are influenced by 
social background and thus are not neutral measures. We would also need to have challenging 
conversations about what we prize and why, what that means for our environment and the 
behaviour and the people that it privileges. The legal academy would need to be willing to give 
proper weight for the unseen work, often undertaken by women, that allows others to be able to 
pursue their own goals knowing that the law school continues to run without them. And that is 
a much wider conversation to be had within the academy, but one which is must have if it is to 
stay true to its mission to hold power to account and to challenge orthodoxy.
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